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Abstract 
This aƌtiĐle uses FiŶĐh͛s idea of ͚displaǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ to aŶalǇse the pƌoĐess iŶ ǁhiĐh autoďiogƌaphiĐal 
statements for family immigration applications and appeals are drafted in the UK. I argue that Legal 
‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes plaǇ a keǇ ƌole iŶ ͚tƌaŶslatiŶg Đultuƌe͛ ;Good, ϮϬϭϭͿ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ďoth ĐoŶteŶt aŶd 
form, a process which is primarily driven by the need to demonstrate compatibility with the cultural 
assumptions of ethnocentrically-ĐoŶĐeiǀed IŵŵigƌatioŶ ‘ules. These ‘ules aĐt as ͚ ŵoƌal gate-keepeƌs͛ 
;WƌaǇ, ϮϬϬϲͿ to set liŵits oŶ the ĐoŶĐeptual stƌuĐtuƌe of ͚faŵilǇ͛ aŶd to outliŶe ǁhat a ͚geŶuiŶe͛ 
marital relationship looks like, thereby excluding cultural Others. The findings show that Legal 
Representatives translate the experiences, norms and values of their clients͛ ƌelatioŶships using 
authorial devices to make the account ring true within a commonsense understanding of British 
culture. I suggest that Legal Representatives thus contribute to a successful outcome for those lacking 
in cultural capital.   
 
 Introduction 
 
The Immigration Rules require those wishing to enter the UK from outside the EU on the basis of 
marriage or civil partnership1 ǁith a Bƌitish ĐitizeŶ oƌ ƌefugee, deŵoŶstƌate that ͞eaĐh of the paƌties 
intends to live permanently with the other as his or her spouse or civil partner and the marriage or 
Điǀil paƌtŶeƌship is suďsistiŶg͟ ;HCϯϵϱ: Ϯϴϭ;iiiͿ, 352A(iv); and 2.6, 2.10 of E-ECP Appendix FM). Unlike 
other parts of the same paragraph (which relate to English-language ability, financial circumstances, 
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accommodation, proof of the marriage and identity) intention and subsistence cannot be readily 
evidenced by documentation. Instead, the applicant and their UK-based sponsor must attempt to 
prove their relationship as genuine through a narrative display detailing how they met, how they 
married, and how they remain in contact. For those on a low income and eligible for Legal Aid such a 
statement is usually drawn up with a Legal Representative or solicitor (hereafter Representative), 
through semi-structured interviews with the sponsor of the marriage.  
In 2010, the government announced plans to curtail Legal Aid for immigration applications and 
appeals. From April 2013, applicants will be left to their own devices to prove the genuine nature of 
their relationship unless they pay for representation. Research on the effectiveness of Immigration 
Tribunals prior to Legal Aid funding found that those provided with representation without charge 
saw an increase in the probability of success from 20% to 38% (Genn and Genn, 1989:87).2 The loss of 
representation is therefore likely to have significant prejudicial impact on the chances of transnational 
couples being able to settle in the UK. The Judges, Representatives and Home Office officials 
iŶteƌǀieǁed foƌ GeŶŶ aŶd GeŶŶ͛s studǇ ĐoŵplaiŶed ƌepeatedlǇ of the pƌolifeƌatioŶ of Đase laǁ aŶd 
legislation which meant managing ǁithout ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ ǁas ͞iŵpossiďle͟ foƌ the oƌdiŶaƌǇ peƌsoŶ 
ǁho pƌeseŶted theiƌ stoƌǇ ͞iŶ aŶ uŶdiffeƌeŶtiated stƌeaŵ of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟ ;ϭϵϴϵ:ϭϴϰ-198). Some 
twenty years, ten Acts, and several thousand reported cases later, immigration law is now so extensive 
that it is considered specialist even for those trained in the law.  
I use the teƌŵ ͚displaǇiŶg geŶuiŶeŶess͛ dƌaǁiŶg oŶ FiŶĐh͛s ǁoƌk ǁho has aƌgued that ͞families need 
to be ͚displayed͛ as well as ͚doŶe͛͟ ;ϮϬϬϳ:ϲϲͿ. FiŶĐh͛s foĐus is pƌiŵaƌilǇ oŶ soĐial display whereby 
ŵeŵďeƌs seek ͞ŵeaŶiŶgful͟ ;ϮϬϬϳ:ϳϵͿ ƌeĐogŶitioŶ as a faŵilǇ uŶit fƌoŵ the ǁideƌ Đultuƌal gƌoup. 
However, she observes that display can be aimed at public agencies, a point expanded upon by Haynes 
and Dermott who note that family display can be externally or internally driven (2011:145). This 
ĐoŶĐept of ͚ displaǇ͛ is a useful leŶs thƌough ǁhiĐh to ĐoŶsideƌ faŵilǇ ŵigƌatioŶ: the stateŵeŶts Đƌeated 
for right of entry into the UK are an externally-dƌiǀeŶ ĐoŶsĐious ͚displaǇ͛ of faŵilǇ aŶd ƌelationship for 
the purpose of registering them as meaningful within a UK cultural framework.  
Drawing on a sample of seven observations of Representatives in the process of drafting statements 
with sponsors, analysis of those statements, and interviews with seven Representatives, I shed light 
oŶ the pƌoĐess of tuƌŶiŶg aŶ ͞ uŶdiffeƌeŶtiated stƌeaŵ͟ iŶto a stƌuĐtuƌed peƌsoŶal stateŵeŶt displaǇiŶg 
cross-cultural and transnational relationships. 
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Background 
 
Academics have convincingly demonstrated the link between non-white migration to the UK and 
legislative response in the form of limiting and controlling that migration (Castles and Miller, 1998; 
Wray, 2006). The 1971 Immigration Act brought into play a notion of patriality which gave British-born 
citizens an unrestƌiĐted ƌight to liǀe, ǁoƌk aŶd studǇ iŶ the UK thƌough the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ƌight of aďode͛. 
Those without the right of abode had to qualify for permission to enter under one of the categories in 
the Immigration Rules.3 The Rules were born of, and drafted within, a perceived challenge to an 
imagined cultural or ethnic national identity. Family law is a frontier post of this outward-facing 
pƌeseŶtatioŶ of the ŶatioŶal ĐolleĐtiǀe ďeĐause of its ͞ peĐuliaƌ poǁeƌ͟ as a tool of ͞ politiĐal eǆpƌessioŶ 
of the gƌoup͛s power to determine its (non-teƌƌitoƌialͿ ŵeŵďeƌship ďouŶdaƌies͟ ;“haĐhaƌ, ϮϬϬϭ:ϱϰͿ. 
The Rules for foreign nationals who wish to join a UK-ďased spouse ĐoŶtaiŶ aŶ eleŵeŶt of ͚ƌite-of-
passage͛, a Đultuƌal ĐoŶteŶt ǁhiĐh seeks to ďoth eliŵiŶate Đultuƌal-Others from the contest, and 
smooth out cultural differences amongst the nominally eligible.  
The most obvious embedded culturally-specific aspect to the Rules in relation to family is the defining 
of group membership (Kofman, 2004). For spouses, this includes same-sex couples, but not additional 
wives of polygamous marriages.4 Moƌe ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial has ďeeŶ the ƌepeated eŶgageŵeŶt ǁith ͞ŵoƌal 
gate-keepiŶg͟ ;WƌaǇ, ϮϬϬϲ:ϯϬϯͿ thƌough the defiŶiŶg of ǁhat ŵakes a ͚geŶuiŶe͛ ŵaƌƌiage. A ŵajoƌ 
example of this was the Primary Purpose Rule (1985-1997) which required couples to prove a negative: 
that the primary purpose of their marriage was not to obtain admission to the UK, which effectively 
discriminated against arranged marriages and thereby limited entry of those from the Indian 
subcontinent (“aĐhdeǀa, ϭϵϵϯͿ. UpoŶ the aďolitioŶ of this ƌule, ͚iŶteŶtioŶ aŶd suďsisteŶĐe͛ ďeĐaŵe 
the key test of genuineness (Wray, 2006:309). However, during the course of research this test was 
oǀeƌtakeŶ ďǇ ŵoƌe oǀeƌt ͞politiĐal eǆpƌessioŶ͟ of ethnocentric boundary-defining with the complete 
redrafting of Part 8 (Family Members) of HC395 and its replacement with Appendix FM on 9th July 
2012. Most notoriously Appendix FM requires that transnational couples demonstrate a high income 
threshold if they wish to reside in the UK (the sponsor must have a minimum annual income of £18,600 
which is nearly £7,000 higher than someone working a 37.5 hour week on the minimum wage).5 
Appendix FM also makes explicit the role of the Rules as moral gatekeepers, with sections entitled 
͚“uitaďilitǇ͛ ;ǁhiĐh laǇs out ǁho is to ďe eǆĐluded oƌ ĐoŶsideƌed ͚uŶsuitaďle͛ as a paƌtŶeƌ foƌ a Bƌitish 
citizen6Ϳ aŶd ͚EligiďilitǇ͛ ;ǁhiĐh laǇs out the ƌeƋuiƌed assets foƌ suitaďle paƌtŶeƌs7). In this manner the 
aspiring spousal imŵigƌaŶt is set oŶ a pathǁaǇ to aŶ iŵagiŶed ;aŶd aspiƌatioŶalͿ ͚BƌitishŶess͛ eǀeŶ 
before arriving on UK soil.  
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Appendix FM was accompanied by a Guidance Note (Annex FM 2.0) instructing Entry Clearance 
Officers (ECOs) on how to assess genuineness. The guidanĐe states that suĐh aŶ assessŵeŶt ͞is Ŷot a 
checklist or tick-ďoǆ eǆeƌĐise͟ ďut theŶ pƌoǀides a ĐheĐklist of siǆ faĐtoƌs assoĐiated ǁith geŶuiŶeŶess 
and twenty-tǁo faĐtoƌs assoĐiated ǁith ͚shaŵ͛ ŵaƌƌiages. Of the siǆ positiǀe faĐtoƌs, fiǀe hold that 
genuineness is demonstrated through practices which might be commonly associated with a secular 
modern couple: evidence of a long-term relationship, cohabitation, having children together, sharing 
a ŵoƌtgage, oƌ ǀisitiŶg eaĐh otheƌ͛s hoŵe ĐouŶtƌies. OŶe ƌelates to arranged marriages and focuses 
on consent. Of the twenty-tǁo Ŷegatiǀe faĐtoƌs, siǆ ƌelate to ͚foƌĐed ŵaƌƌiages͛8 and five to 
immigration history, including having previously sponsored a spouse or having been sponsored in this 
ĐategoƌǇ: the iŵpliĐatioŶ ďeiŶg that ͚geŶuiŶe͛ tƌaŶsŶatioŶal ;aŶd aƌƌaŶgedͿ ŵaƌƌiages last a lifetiŵe. 
Also included are not sharing financial or domestic responsibilities, not knowing much about the life 
of the UK spouse, Ŷot haǀiŶg ͞ a shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the Đoƌe faĐts of theiƌ ƌelatioŶship͟, oƌ haǀiŶg 
few people at the wedding: all factors which might be common for the newlyweds of an arranged 
marriage. The guidaŶĐe aĐts ďoth to eǆĐlude, ďǇ defiŶiŶg soŵe ĐultuƌallǇ diffeƌeŶt pƌaĐtiĐes as ͚shaŵ͛, 
aŶd to ƌeifǇ, ďǇ liŵitiŶg aƌƌaŶged ŵaƌƌiages as those to ǁhiĐh ͞the Đouple ďoth ĐoŶseŶt to the 
marriage and agree with the plans made by their families͟. ͚GeŶuiŶe͛ aƌƌaŶged ŵaƌƌiages aƌe those 
arranged by families rather than through marriage-brokers, friends, the Internet, or the couple 
themselves. This guidance sets up traps for those who do not fit neatly into prescribed cultural 
practices. 
In common with a general academic neglect of family migration as a topic of study (Charsley et al, 
2012; Kofman 2004), there has been little work on how the cultural content of the Immigration Rules 
is Ŷegotiated ǁithiŶ legal pƌaĐtiĐe. AŶ eǆĐeptioŶ is HoldeŶ͛s edited ǀoluŵe oŶ ͞Đultuƌal eǆpeƌtise͟ iŶ 
litigation in the West involving South Asian migrants (2011), which concentrates on the relatively rare 
oĐĐasioŶs ǁheŶ aĐadeŵiĐs aƌe eŶlisted to eǆplaiŶ ͚Đultuƌe͛ to the Đouƌt. With the exception of Good 
(2011), whose empirical work covered the UK asylum process, Representatives are given scant 
attention. Good deŵoŶstƌates the Đleaƌ Ŷeed foƌ ǁhat he teƌŵs ͚Đultuƌal tƌaŶslatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϭϰͿ, aŶd 
Ŷotes that ͞the pƌoĐesses ǁheƌeďǇ asǇluŵ laǁǇeƌs stƌuĐtuƌe theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ statements to maximise 
theiƌ iŵpaĐt as eǀideŶĐe haǀe ƌeĐeiǀed little atteŶtioŶ up to Ŷoǁ,͟ ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϭϬϬͿ.9 He suggests that 
‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes plaǇ a ĐƌuĐial ƌole iŶ stƌuĐtuƌiŶg ͞theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts according to the common 
sense expectations of western legal Đultuƌe͟ ;ϮϬϬϵ:ϴϯͿ; aŶd iŶ ĐoŶǀeƌtiŶg those aĐĐouŶts fƌoŵ ǁhat 
CoŶleǇ aŶd O͛Baƌƌ Đall ͚ƌelatioŶal ŵode͛ – in which claims are framed in relation to notions of morality 
or fairness – iŶto ͚ƌule-oƌieŶted ŵode͛ – in which claims are framed in relation to specific rules or law 
(2006:67-74). Good notes this difference in approach as a fundamental difference between non-
represented and represented people (2011:119).  
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Building on the theoretical insights of Wray (2006, 2009) into Đultuƌal defiŶitioŶ of ͚genuine͛ marriage 
and Good͛s eŵpiƌiĐal ǁoƌk ;2011), this study investigates the mechanisms of how transnational 
ŵaƌƌiages aƌe ͚displaǇed͛ as ͞ŵeaŶiŶgful͟ ;FiŶĐh ϮϬϬϳͿ to the UK offiĐial. ͚Cultuƌe͛ is used thƌoughout 
iŶ a ͚ĐoŵŵoŶseŶse͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg iŶ oƌdeƌ to eǆaŵiŶe its use as ͚aĐtaŶt͛ iŶ legal disĐouƌse ;HoldeŶ, 
2011:7-ϴͿ ǁheƌe it is ofteŶ ͞looselǇ uŶdeƌstood as the ͚tƌaditioŶ of the otheƌ͛͟ ;Bouillieƌ, ϮϬϭϭ:ϱϰͿ aŶd 
defined externally. The study focuses on two aspects – the cultural translation of norms and values 
(rather than jurisdictions) at their most apparent; and cultural translation in its most hidden guise, 
stoƌǇiŶg a life to ŵake it ͚geŶuiŶe͛.  
 Methodology 
 
Access to Representatives was made through a combination of my own contacts gained working 
within the field from 2001-2011 and through cold-emailing/calling. Three of the participants were ex-
colleagues; two were acquaintances and two were unknown to me prior to this research. Three were 
male and five were white. Six of the participants worked in law firms which held a Legal Aid contract 
to supply immigration advice and representation. One Representative worked in private practice.  
Access to the sponsor participants came through the Representatives, who having agreed to take part 
in the project, either directly approached suitable clients or allowed me to approach them at the start 
of their scheduled interview. This resulted in seven observations of five of the Representatives. My 
previous experience was invaluable in gaining access: I was perceived as a trusted insider by the 
Representatives and was presented by them to their clients as such. Five of the sponsors were 
refugees, and all bar one had complicated history with the UK Border Agency (UKBA). The observations 
covered both applications and appeals being made under Appendix FM, Rule 281, and 352A. 
The interviews and two of the observations were recorded and transcribed using naturalised 
transcription (Davidson, 2009). In the five observations where permission to record was declined the 
English-speaking elements were transcribed as the observation progressed.  
The studǇ ĐoŶsideƌs ͚Đultuƌe͛ as it is uŶdeƌstood, tƌaŶslated, aŶd ;ƌeͿpƌoduĐed ďǇ the ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes 
through conversation and then displayed in narrative form. Thus both conversation analysis and 
narrative analysis were used to gain insight from the data. The words of the legal interviews which I 
observed are the primary site in which the content-to-be of the statement is extrapolated, negotiated 
and translated. Conversation analysis as an analytic tool (Ten Have, 2007) allows cultural translation 
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to be seen in process. The theoretical assumptions of conversation analysis are also pertinent: social 
interaction requires participants to understand culturally-specific meaning-frames, and it is this aspect 
of the role of the Representative which is under the microscope here.  
Clandinin draws a distinction between narrative inquirers who focus on the telling of narrative and 
those who focus on the living (2007:xi). This study is situated in the former camp, however it differs 
from the majority of such sociological inquiries since I have interviewed my participants about how 
they elicit narratives, and observed them in this process. This ƌeseaƌĐh is a studǇ of ͞liǀed teǆtualitǇ͟ 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͞liǀed eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ ;DeŶziŶ, ϭϵϵϳ:ϯϯͿ;, it is aŶ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of hoǁ ͞liǀed teǆtualitǇ͟ is 
produced as a right of entry (and rite-of-passage) requirement and the belief systems that operate 
around that.  
 Translating Culture 
 
In order to demonstrate genuineness, Representatives are aware that the relationship must be 
displayed using descriptive categories that resonate (i.e. are meaningful) within the perceived culture 
of the decision-maker. Some culturally-Otheƌ pƌaĐtiĐes aƌe eǆĐluded as too ͚Otheƌ͛, ǁhilst soŵe aƌe 
permitted but require translation into frameworks that are recognisable to the imagined decision-
maker. The Representatives remained open-ŵiŶded aŶd aĐĐeptiŶg of theiƌ ĐlieŶt͛s aĐĐouŶts, ďut 
nonetheless repeatedly challenged those accounts for the purposes of achieving a successful 
outcome. 
In the interviews, Representatives highlighted cultural practices to which they were accustomed to 
setting in context. For example, L‘ϰ ĐoŵŵeŶted ͞and then we have to explain a lot of details [...] why 
there are no letters, ǁhiĐh is Ǉou kŶoǁ iŶ that Đase, “oŵali theǇ doŶ͛t ǁƌite, so eǆplaiŶ that.͟ Similarly, 
LR7 stated:   
I haǀe a ďatĐh of ĐlieŶts ǁhiĐh I Đall ŵǇ AfƌiĐaŶ ŵeŶ ĐlieŶts ;;‘: Ok.ͿͿ ǁho doŶ͛t do 
emails and love letters and, all that sort of thing, ((R: Ok.)) so oďǀiouslǇ ǁith ƌefusals it͛s, 
aŶd ǁith stateŵeŶts, it͛s ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt to put the Đultuƌal ĐoŶteǆt to it. [...] It͛s so 
important to actually translate that to the Immigration Judge, the decision-maker who's 
actually looking at the refusal. 
LR7 Interview 
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In several of the observations however, Representatives struggled in order to fully comprehend their 
ĐlieŶts͛ eǆplaŶatioŶs foƌ ǁhǇ thiŶgs had happeŶed iŶ the ǁaǇ theǇ had aŶd heŶĐe ďe aďle to eǆplaiŶ 
it fully through the tool of the statement.  
For example, Sponsor B, a British Citizen, had married her Egyptian husband in an Islamic ceremony 
which was subsequently formalised in an Egyptian court. He remained married to his first wife, despite 
the complete breakdown of the marriage, in order that he could continue to visit his children without 
restriction. Following the principles of private international law, the marriage is valid if it is conducted 
in accordance with the law of the place of its celebration. In Egypt, polygamy is permitted, so the 
marriage is valid. However, the capacity of the parties to marry is established by the law of the country 
where they are domiciled (Clayton, 2008). As a person domiciled in the UK, B did not have the legal 
capacity to enter into a polygamous marriage, which makes the marriage invalid for immigration 
purposes. B and her husband are in a Catch 22 situation: stuck, not just between national jurisdictions, 
but between one part of the UK state (UKBA) and another (a registry office). The husband cannot now 
divorce his first wife (even if he now chose to) and remarry B in Egypt, or apply to come to the UK as 
a fiancé to marry B, because they are already married. There is, no way to bring the application within 
the Rules. 
During the observation, LR2 asked B to explain the circumstances around her marriage (how they met 
aŶd deĐided to ŵaƌƌǇͿ aŶd ǁas diƌeĐtlǇ tǇpiŶg B͛s stateŵeŶt to aĐĐoŵpaŶǇ the appliĐatioŶ. The 
statement itself will be the evidence that the relationship is genuine, accompanied by photographs 
and communication records. In communication with B, LR2 situates the non-comprehension on the 
paƌt of the eǀeŶtual ƌeadeƌ ;͞eŵďassǇ oƌ Judge͟Ϳ ƌatheƌ thaŶ positioŶiŶg heƌself as disďelieǀeƌ. “he 
also makes repeated use of a rising inclination and ellipsis to minimize the potentially offensive 
͚heaƌaďle ŵeaŶiŶgs͛ ;Mason, 2009). 
Extract of Observation of LR2 with Sponsor B 
 
LR2: Is this, um, the way that that happened, is that (.) a kind of, is that coz of your 
IslaŵiĐ faith that, that theǇ Đould aƌƌaŶge that ŵaƌƌiage, Đoz it͛s not kind of, well not 
aƌƌaŶge it ďut ask soŵeoŶe to fiŶd Ǉou a husďaŶd [isŶ͛t a tǇpiĐal kiŶd of 
B:                        [Yeah, It is Ǉeah it is it͛s just that it 
ǁould usuallǇ ďe ŵǇ dad oƌ ŵǇ ďƌotheƌ that ǁould do it, aŶd I doŶ͛t haǀe, so ǁe did 
the normal thing -hhh except for two different points, is one it was a friend because 
I didŶ͛t haǀe aŶǇďodǇ else -hhh (LR2: Ok.)) and two coz of my age and because of my 
circumstances they put like long engagements and all that are kind of not relevant↑ 
((LR2: Ok.)) Coz my first marriage was exactly the same, was arranged in exactly the 
same way and we were only engaged for a week before we got married as well. 
LR2: That͛s, Ŷoǁ, is that this oŶe Ǉou aƌe talkiŶg aďout, the oŶe, ;;C: Yeah.ͿͿ the ŶiŶe 
Ǉeaƌs↑ Ok. “o. Coz oďǀiouslǇ it͛s a ǀeƌǇ, I͛ŵ ǁƌitiŶg this, aŶd I͛ŵ just ǁoŶdeƌiŶg 
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ǁheŶ the eŵďassǇ oƌ the Judge ƌeads it, theǇ͛ll ďe like ǁhat↑ really↑ Without the 
background ((C: Yeah)) explanation as to why (.) going through a divorce you just 
kind of just ask a frieŶd I͛d like to get ŵaƌƌied aŶd theŶ theǇ go aŶd fiŶd soŵeoŶe 
seeŵs ;.Ϳ Ǉou kŶoǁ fƌoŵ a Ŷoƌŵal Bƌitish Đultuƌe, it͛s= 
B: =Ye-as, it͛s Ŷot doŶe. 
LR2: No. 
B: Because that was one of the things I was afraid, coz it says ((on the application 
form)) was it an arranged marriage and technically in some respects you could say it 
ǁas, ďut it ǁasŶ͛t, ;.Ϳ it ǁasŶ͛t iŶ that APPLICANT ǁasŶ͛t iŶ, ďeĐause F‘IEND didŶ͛t 
kŶoǁ that APPLICANT͛s ƌelatioŶship had ďƌokeŶ doǁŶ as ǁell ;.Ϳ 
LR2: So (.) 
B: Coz APPLICANT had kept that (.) 
LR2: In some10 respects it was an arranged in that erm, in that FRIEND had asked 
APPLICANT to fiŶd ŵe a suitable husbaŶd, but iŶ others, it wasŶ͛t ↑ 
B: BeĐause ǁe didŶ͛t haǀe APPLICANT, APPLICANT ǁasŶ͛t oŶ the list. 
LR2: [APPLICANT wasŶ͛t 
B: [he was only ever supposed to be the middle man.  
LR2: Ok, then he. Er:m. ((typing)) Ok great. So September 2011 is when you started 
speakiŶg faĐe to faĐe. ;;C: Yeah.ͿͿ ͚k. Hoǁ ;.Ϳ iŶ Islaŵ, agaiŶ, is theƌe aŶǇ, I ŵeaŶ, 
when you first saw him what were your initial thoughts, gƌeat Ǉou͛ll do, he͛s loǀelǇ↑ 
B: [Well, err 
LR2: [did Ǉou like the look of hiŵ↑ 
B: The video thing is a bit rubbish anyway↑ ((LR2: Ok.)) So he looked like a bit of a 
monster. ((LR2: Ok.)) It was all pixelated and ((LR2: Yeah)) poor quality anyway. 
 
B accepts the intended meaning of the ƋuestioŶ oŶ the ͚ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ of heƌ ŵaƌƌiage but with 
ƌeseƌǀatioŶs ;͞Ye-as͟ ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶ affiƌŵatiǀe ͞Yes͟ oƌ agƌeeiŶg ͞Yeah͟Ϳ. “he ƌejeĐts L‘Ϯ͛s atteŵpt 
to explain the marriage through visual attraction, though is happy to embrace physical attraction once 
theǇ aƌe foƌŵallǇ eŶgaged ;͞ďut Ǉou͛ǀe seeŶ piĐtuƌes of hiŵ, so oŶĐe I did aĐtuallǇ see him physically, 
face to faĐe it ǁas just like OhŵǇgod,͟).  She is able to explain the circumstances of her marriage within 
her understanding of her religious culture, because she is both aware of how it differs from a perceived 
cultural norm (Islamic arranged ŵaƌƌiagesͿ aŶd ĐoŶǀeƌsaŶt iŶ the saŵe disĐouƌse of ͚Đultuƌal 
ŶoƌŵalitǇ͛ as that of L‘Ϯ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, lateƌ iŶ the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ she desĐƌiďes fiŶdiŶg heƌ fiƌst husďaŶd 
as ͞a ďit like speed-datiŶg͟ ǁhiĐh L‘Ϯ puts iŶto the stateŵeŶt as ͞It's a bit like IslaŵiĐ speed datiŶg.͟ 
LR2 is searching for cultural overlaps between the arranged marriage where the woman is not alone 
with her fiancé or without hijab (as the client later reminds LR2) until after the marriage, and the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚looks͛ ǁithiŶ WesteƌŶ love matches. Both LR2 and B are aware that the marriage is 
cross-Đultuƌal, Ŷot just tƌaŶsŶatioŶal, aŶd theǇ haǀe theƌefoƌe tƌaŶsgƌessed the ͚Ŷoƌŵs͛ of Bƌitish, 
Bƌitish IslaŵiĐ, EgǇptiaŶ, aŶd EgǇptiaŶ IslaŵiĐ Đultuƌes. The ŵaƌƌiage ĐaŶŶot ďe ͚ďoǆed͛ iŶto any 
comfortably recognisable cultural practice and is pushed literally outside the rules and figuratively to 
the fƌiŶges of plausiďilitǇ. This Đouple ǁill ĐleaƌlǇ fall shoƌt of the guidaŶĐe oŶ ǁhat ŵakes a ͚geŶuiŶe 
aƌƌaŶged ŵaƌƌiage͛: the ŵaƌƌiage ǁas paƌtly arranged by a friend, and partly by themselves; there 
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were no guests at the wedding; they have no shared financial or domestic responsibilities; and both 
parties have been married previously (UKBA, 2.0). The ŵaƌƌiage is too ĐultuƌallǇ ͚Otheƌ͛: ŵoŶogaŵǇ 
in spirit is not sufficient, and they cannot display genuineness, having not followed the unwritten rules 
of ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ Đultuƌal pƌaĐtiĐe.  
I observed LR4 iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg tǁo “oŵali ĐlieŶts thƌough aŶ iŶteƌpƌeteƌ. L‘ϰ͛s ĐoŶsideƌaďle eǆpeƌieŶĐe 
with Somali clients was an important factor in her interviewing technique. She did not present herself, 
as LR2 did, as an unaware but interested acquaintance, but rather as an experienced expert, directing 
the interview straight to the complicating factors surrounding Somali marriage such as the marriage 
certificate (its characteristics and form, how and when they came by it), how the couple kept in touch, 
and how the husband was supporting his wife. Early in the observation she explained to Sponsor F 
why it is a problem that he stated (when he claimed asylum) that he had a child as a result of a one-
night stand with a UK-Somali woman on holiday in Djibouti: because he must now prove a negative, 
that he is not married to the mother of his child. She spoke in brief segments allowing for 
interpretation, but not permitting F to respond until she had finished explaining. She builds alternative 
scenarios into her presentation of the facts thereby allowing F an opening in which he could admit 
that he had actually married the woman in question, a technique which she used earlier in relation to 
the suspect marriage certificate showing her awareness of the importance of the interviewee 
ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg ͚faĐe͛ aŶd also the poteŶtial of the iŶteƌǀieǁee ŵeƌelǇ to pƌoǀide agƌeeŵeŶt ǁith the 
interviewer.  
Like LR2, LR4 begins by softening the discrediting by attributing outright disbelief to external others 
(The Judge[is] going to find it very difficult to believe that the mother of your child had a child without 
being married to you.͟), but then strengthens her confrontation by moving her previously neutral self 
to a positioŶ of aligŶŵeŶt ǁith this ǀieǁ ;͞It͛s ǀeƌǇ uŶĐoŵŵoŶ iŶ “oŵali soĐietǇ͟Ϳ. F defeŶds his 
positioŶ ;aŶd hoŶouƌͿ ďoth iŶ ƌelatioŶ to his Đultuƌe ;ďǇ statiŶg that he ǁas ͞esĐoƌtiŶg͟ someone who 
was not well, i.e. being a good Muslim and dutiful clan-ŵeŵďeƌ, aŶd ͞I ǁas Ŷot iŶ fiŶaŶĐial ĐapaďilitǇ 
to look afteƌ ŵǇself͟ – financial support of a wife usually being a requisite of Somali marriage) and in 
terms of his temporary membership of a ƌefugee diaspoƌa ǁith uŶĐeƌtaiŶ fiŶal destiŶatioŶ ;͞If I had 
known that one day I would be going to the UK and I would be seeing her again, of course I would 
haǀe took ouƌ ƌelatioŶship ŵoƌe seƌiouslǇ͟Ϳ. L‘ϰ does Ŷot oǀeƌtlǇ aĐĐept oƌ ƌejeĐt F͛s defeŶĐe of his 
aĐtioŶs ;although soŵe degƌee of opiŶioŶ Đould ďe ƌead iŶto the pause ďefoƌe ͞ǁoŵaŶ͟ below), but 
presents her objections in relation to the difficulty of displaying genuineness given an apparent 
Đultuƌal aďŶoƌŵalitǇ ;͞Theƌe͛s Ŷo issue ǁith Ǉou taking it casually, the issue is with her being a Muslim 
“oŵali ;.Ϳ ǁoŵaŶ.͟Ϳ LR4 then looks for a cultural explanation which might have resonance with a UK 
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decision-maker – if the woman in question is UK-born, or has lived in the UK all her life, it might be 
possible to consider her as having UK morals rather than those perceived to be held by a Muslim 
Somali woman. 
The aim of these legal interviews is to produce a narrative which explains the actions and beliefs of 
the sponsor within the framework of an imagined reader, the decision-maker (ECO or Judge). Thus 
descriptive elements to the narrative must include categories which are recognisable to the reader: 
If a speaker is to describe a scene so as to enable co-participants (which include not only 
the witness, but also, of course, members of the Tribunal, etc.) to recognise a particular 
iŵpoƌt oƌ ͚seŶse͛ of the sĐeŶe he is desĐƌiďiŶg, the seleĐtioŶ of Đategoƌies fƌoŵ the 
alternatives available cannot be an arbitrary (subjective, individual) matter.  
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979:121) 
LR2 and LR4 are looking for descriptive categories that are familiar to the UK official by which means 
the actions and beliefs of the sponsor might be explained. The role of cultural translator here is based 
on a commonsense understanding that hearers/readers of the narrative will only understand (and 
therefore accept as genuine) that which resonates with their own experience. Descriptions will neither 
ďe heaƌd, oƌ if heaƌd ǁill Ŷot ďe aĐĐepted as ͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛, if the Đategoƌies aƌe too alieŶ to the experience 
of the reader. Only if these two conditions are in place, can inferences be drawn from those 
descriptions (Atkinson and Drew, drawing upon the work of Sacks, 1979:121). Whilst Lord Bingham 
has cautioned judges against using themselves as the ͞ƌeasoŶaďle ŵaŶ͟ agaiŶst ǁhiĐh to Đoŵpaƌe 
otheƌ ŵeŶ͛s aĐtioŶs aŶd ďeliefs ;Kasolo), Representatives are routinely setting the Judge as a 
benchmark. 
The extracts and analysis above illustrate both the need for cultural translation and the difficulties 
encountered in enacting that translation. It is hard to see how, without the assistanĐe of a ͚Đultuƌal 
tƌaŶslatoƌ͛, the sponsors would have been able to explain (and through this, to display genuineness) 
to the Tribunal the circumstances of their marriages. It seems likely, given these examples above, that 
the loss of Legal Aid will result in higher failure rates. Further, the dangers of reification of culture 
ďeĐoŵe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ appaƌeŶt if ǁe foĐus oŶ the spoŶsoƌs fƌoŵ oŶe paƌtiĐulaƌ ͚Đultuƌal͛ group, the 
Somalis. E, an apparently doting father and husband, who proudly showed pictures of his children and 
wife and explained the complicated process of how he had supported them financially throughout his 
years in the UK whilst his asylum case went from appeal to appeal, failed to accurately remember 
(during the observation, when filling in the application form, and when he claimed asylum) the dates 
of birth of his children or when he married. In his case, the ECO refused the application – with implicit 
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reference to UK cultural norms – because he did not believe that E is married to his wife or that his 
children are his/legitimate because otherwise he would know such dates. E asserted his marriage to 
be genuine through reference to Somali culture: such a thing (having children out of wedlock) does 
not happen. The observation with F, which took place immediately after that of E, centred on the 
ƌeǀeƌse pƌeŵise. The ECO had ƌefused the appliĐatioŶ of F͛s ǁife ďeĐause F had a Đhild ǁith a “oŵali 
woman who must, by the norms of Somali culture, have been married to F, and since no divorce 
certificate was supplied with the application, his marriage to the applicant is polygamous. F 
demonstrated his cultural hybridity as he asserted his account as truthful, referencing Islamic, Somali, 
aŶd Ǉouth Đultuƌe iŶ his eǆplaŶatioŶ of his ͞Đasual͟ oŶe-off affair. In the former case, the ECO fails to 
ĐoŶsideƌ his oǁŶ ďeliefs aŶd ďehaǀiouƌ as ͞ĐultuƌallǇ Đoded͟ ;Ballaƌd, ϮϬϬϵ:ϯϭϭͿ aŶd uŶiǀeƌsalises a 
Western cultural norm in the Refusal: birthdays and anniversaries are celebrated and remembered. 
In the latter case, the ECO applies a fixed and rigid application of a supposed cultural norm (Somali 
women do not have children out of wedlock) using culture as a determinant of behaviour.  
These examples show the dangers of reifying a culture or cultural practice – the sponsors may have 
acted with some degree of accordance with their conscious and unconscious perceptions of their 
religious and cultural norms, but such norms remain unwritten and unspecified precisely because they 
are somewhat fluid; in any case norms are not strict rules. Further, these sponsors have all 
experienced the conflicts and opportunities of transnational identities which can free them to act in 
ǁaǇs that ŵight Ŷot ďe eǆpeĐted ;see Paƌekh, ϮϬϬϲͿ. The oďseƌǀatioŶs also ĐhalleŶge Ballaƌd͛s fiŶdiŶg 
that lawyers are complicit in failing to see their own outlook as culturally coded. The Representatives 
demonstrated constant awareness of this as they negotiated the real and perceived cultural 
assumptions of the ECOs and (imagined) Judge and sought to embed arguments against such 
assumptions within the statement, even as they (re)produced such cultural assumptions as part of 
their institutional interaction. Truth as narrative 
 
If Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is seeŶ as ͞the fuŶdaŵeŶtal uŶit that aĐĐouŶts foƌ huŵaŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ ;PiŶŶegaƌ aŶd 
Daynes, 2007:4), then the cultural barriers between a city high-Đouƌt judge aŶd ͞a NigeƌiaŶ ŵeƌĐhaŶt, 
oƌ aŶ IŶdiaŶ ships' eŶgiŶeeƌ, oƌ a Yugoslaǀ ďaŶkeƌ͟ ;BiŶghaŵ iŶ Kasolo, 1985) can be overcome in the 
same manner as the high-court judge overcomes the differences between him, and less often her, and 
a British pregnant shoplifter: by reading and taking account of the information in the Equal Treatment 
Benchbook. Freeman reminds us that whilst narrative is by no means unique to the West, in other 
cultures it is more a public and collective affair and that autobiographical understanding – the 
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narrative most commonly used in sociological narrative inquiry – ͞ŵaǇ ďe ǀiƌtuallǇ ŶoŶeǆisteŶt͟ 
outside the West (2007:121-2). The difficulties demonstrated above could be only indicative of 
culturally-different but explainable practices, but I want to consider whether it is form as well as 
content that requires translation. In this section, I will begin by considering why Representatives 
Đhoose to displaǇ theiƌ ĐlieŶt͛s eǀideŶĐe iŶ the foƌŵ of aŶ autoďiogƌaphiĐal Ŷaƌƌative, and look at what 
cultural assumptions are being made through this. I will then look at the authoring of these 
autobiographical statements and consider the constant friction between the form and its authoring. 
The Civil Procedure Rules give the following description of a witness statement: 
͞A ǁitŶess stateŵeŶt is a ǁƌitteŶ stateŵeŶt sigŶed ďǇ a peƌsoŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶs the 
eǀideŶĐe ǁhiĐh that peƌsoŶ ǁould ďe alloǁed to giǀe oƌallǇ.͟  
(CPR 1998: 32.4(1)) 
A witness statement is a required document for an Immigration Appeal and its presentation usually 
formal and stylised. It must be formally adopted by the signee at the outset of the Tribunal hearing 
and acts as a substitution for the giving of evidence-in-chief. Thus the form is in part prescribed by 
procedural rules. There are obvious time-saving advantages to this method, but it also allows 
sponsors/appellants to overcome the more restrictive elements of case-presentation that are found 
in a criminal court where witnesses can only supply responses to examineƌ͛s ƋuestioŶs ;AtkiŶsoŶ aŶd 
Drew, 1979:34-81). In response to questions on why and how they draft statements, six of the 
Representatives made repeated reference to the point and style of construction in relation to it being 
͚ďelieǀaďle͛. At oŶe leǀel, for the Representatives (and certainly the law) the relationship between the 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe of the eǀeŶt aŶd the aĐtual eǀeŶt is iĐoŶogƌaphiĐ, ǁhiĐh is to saǇ ͞Ŷaƌƌatiǀes aƌe seeŶ as 
ǀeƌďal iĐoŶs of the eǀeŶts theǇ ƌeĐouŶt͟ ;BauŵaŶ; ϭϵϴϲ:ϱͿ. ͞‘eal Đouples͟, argued LR6, can write an 
account of their relationship history because it occurred iŶ ͚ƌeal life͛. At a second level the drafting of 
stateŵeŶts, like the ǁƌitiŶg of histoƌǇ aŶd fiĐtioŶ foƌ White, ͞pƌesupposes a ŶotioŶ of ƌealitǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
͞the tƌue͟ is ideŶtified ǁith ͞the ƌeal͟ oŶlǇ iŶsofaƌ as it ĐaŶ ďe shoǁŶ to possess the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of 
ŶaƌƌatiǀitǇ͟ ;ϭϵϴϬ:ϭϬͿ. GeŶuiŶeŶess Đoŵes iŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe foƌŵ: ͞thinking if I give a history behind it, the 
stoƌǇ ďehiŶd it theŶ it ŵakes it ŵoƌe ďelieǀaďle͟ ;L‘ϰͿ.  
Finch argues that displaǇ is ĐƌuĐial to faŵilies ďeĐause ͞ relationships are both defined and experienced 
by their quality – Ŷot siŵplǇ theiƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ ;ϮϬϬϳ:ϳϵͿ. AppliĐaŶts aŶd theiƌ spoŶsoƌs ŵaǇ haǀe theiƌ 
own lived experience of family life, but in order to demonstrate its genuineness, Representatives 
ďelieǀe theǇ ŵust displaǇ Ŷot just faĐt ;suĐh as ŵaƌƌiage ĐeƌtifiĐateͿ, ďut ͚ƋualitǇ͛: 
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͞Ah, I ŵiss heƌ,͟ aŶd ok, Ǉou ŵiss heƌ, ďut hoǁ do Ǉou ŵiss heƌ, ǁhat do Ǉou ŵiss of 
her, and sometime with (.) women you get lovely statement, you know I miss his smell, I 
ŵiss Ǉou kŶoǁ, soŵe, aŶd otheƌs aƌe ŵoƌe, Ǉou kŶoǁ, I just ŵiss the ĐoŵpaŶǇ↑  
LR4 Interview 
It is oŶlǇ thƌough a WesteƌŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of autoďiogƌaphiĐal Ŷaƌƌatiǀe that the ͚ƋualitǇ͛ aŶd 
theƌefoƌe the ͚geŶuiŶeŶess͛ of the ƌelatioŶship ĐaŶ ďe displaǇed. This is ďoth aĐtiǀelǇ puƌsued ďǇ 
Representatives and expected within Immigration Tribunals as part of legal convention. It is entirely 
externally driven and the external agents involved have a strong degree of control (see Haynes and 
Dermott, 2011) over what is said and how it is said.   
The stateŵeŶt ŵust ďe ͞ǀeƌified ďǇ a stateŵeŶt of tƌuth͟ ǁhiĐh is to ďe sigŶed ďǇ ͞the ŵakeƌ of the 
stateŵeŶt͟ ;CP‘ ϭϵϵϴ:ϮϮ.ϭͿ. Practice Directions on the same matter instruct that the statement 
͞ŵust, if pƌaĐtiĐaďle, ďe iŶ the iŶteŶded ǁitŶess͛s oǁŶ ǁoƌds͟ ;CP‘ ϭϵϵϴ, PƌaĐtiĐe DiƌeĐtioŶ ϭϴ.ϭͿ. As 
noted above, the law operates within the realms of positivistic assumptions – ͚faĐts͛ aƌe ƌeal aŶd eǆist 
independently from the discoverer;11 ͚tƌuth͛ ;oŶ the ͚ďalaŶĐe of pƌoďaďilities͛Ϳ ĐaŶ ďe estaďlished – 
but how can such a set of assumptions be happily demonstrated by reliance on a method (narrative 
inquiry) which is fundamentally post-positivist in its embrace of the relationship between teller and 
listener in the creation of the told (see Pinnegar and Daynes, 2007)? And how is ownership taken up 
effeĐtiǀelǇ ďǇ the spoŶsoƌ ǁheŶ theǇ haǀe Ŷot ͚authoƌed͛ the teǆt?  
‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes ǁeƌe shoǁŶ the ͚tƌaŶsĐƌiďeƌ – ghost-writer – authoƌ͛ liŶe (shown below) and asked 
to place themselves, as Representatives, on that line, having debated and reached common 
understanding of the terms involved.  
Insert diagram here 
Although the diagram shows the participants locating themselves across the range froŵ ͚tƌaŶsĐƌiďeƌ͛ 
to ͚authoƌ͛, ǁheŶ asked to desĐƌiďe theiƌ aĐtual appƌoaĐh theƌe ǁas little diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ theŵ. 
Thus, their position on the line reflects not so much what they actually do, but rather their perception 
of their approach to drafting the statement. LR1, however, was an exception. He declared himself an 
author without hesitation and stated his approach to be rule-based or refusal-led. The language used 
in the final statement was formal and legalistic and did not reflect the language used by Sponsor A or 
the iŶteƌpƌeteƌ: ͞I ǁould like to ĐoŶfiƌŵ that ŵǇ husďaŶd NAME is ǀalidlǇ aŶd legallǇ ŵaƌƌied to ŵe, 
that we have met each other, that we intend to live permanently with one another as husband and 
ǁife, [...]͟. During the interview with A, he typed the statement and read out what he was typing as 
he went along. The client listened and supplied confirmation in relation to names and dates. The 
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resulting statement is more declaration than narrative, and the advantages to this method – especially 
when interpreters are involved (see below) – are clear in that there is no conflict over (re)storying 
events. The disadvantages relate to the spoŶsoƌ͛s involvement in the process. Throughout the 
interview A made jokes in English and Somali which perhaps reflected discomfort at her lack of 
involvement. At the end of the interview she had to be persuaded that the statement should be read 
ďaĐk thƌough to heƌ iŶdiĐatiŶg iŶdiffeƌeŶĐe to ͚oǁŶeƌship͛ of the stateŵeŶt. 
LR6, in private practice, who was very aware of authorial conflict, was able to side-step the issue 
somewhat due to the nature of his largely articulate and literate client-base. He directed his clients in 
the drafting of their own narratives for application stage and complemented their personal statements 
ǁith a ŵoƌe foƌŵal ͚authoƌed͛ ǁitŶess stateŵeŶt foƌ aŶǇ appeal aƌisiŶg. L‘Ϯ, L‘ϯ aŶd L‘ϱ also 
instructed their clients to write their own statements for applications when they were sufficiently 
articulate, albeit for them this was a relatively rare occasion.  
At the other end of the scale was LR7, who responded to the chart in the first instance by saying she 
was merely the person who typed the narrative. “he saǁ heƌself as a ĐoŶduit foƌ heƌ ĐlieŶt: ͞I mean I 
literally climb inside the minds of my clients to actually experience, you know to get that experience 
ǁƌitteŶ doǁŶ.͟ Despite her repeated insistence that the statement is owned by her client throughout 
(at nine points in her interview she stated ͞it͛s the ĐlieŶt͛s stoƌǇ͟), when challenged she confirmed 
that she supplied the structure: which is to say chronology, logic, and paragraph-content. LR2, LR3, 
LR4, and LR5 described a similar template to that of LR7.  
These Representatives begin by giving the narrator authenticity as a character (making them 
͚ƌeliaďle͛Ϳ, usiŶg desĐƌiptiǀe Đategoƌies suĐh as ďaĐkgƌouŶd aŶd eduĐatioŶ ;fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh, foƌ eǆaŵple, 
class might be inferred), even when they were aware that it was surplus to requirements. LR7 asked 
heƌ ĐlieŶts to ͞eǆplaiŶ to ŵe ǁheƌe Ǉou Đoŵe fƌoŵ, [...] ǁhat͛s Ǉouƌ ďaĐkgƌouŶd, ǁheƌe did Ǉou go to 
sĐhool eǀeŶ if it͛s Ŷot relevant in a spouse application because you know your education is not, but it 
Ŷeeds to haǀe ĐoŶteǆt so the Judge aĐtuallǇ uŶdeƌstaŶds͟. LR6 stipulated that his clients (sponsor and 
appliĐaŶtͿ ǁƌite theiƌ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes sepaƌatelǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ͞reflect the two of theŵ as iŶdiǀiduals,͟ aŶd 
commented iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the oďseƌǀatioŶ ͞I ǁaŶt his iŶdiǀidualitǇ to Đoŵe out aŶd I͛ŵ Ŷot ƌeallǇ 
ďotheƌed if that doesŶ͛t ƌeallǇ fit ǁith eǀeƌǇthiŶg else.͟ LR4 felt that using formal language ͞distoƌts 
theiƌ ǀoiĐes aŶd theƌefoƌe it distoƌts ǁho theǇ aƌe.͟ With the exception of LR1, all the Representatives 
tƌied to use theiƌ ĐlieŶts͛ ǁoƌds.  
Using an interpreter could make the paradox of displaying authenticity through character more 
evident as it adds a further layer of distance between the events and their final representation. 
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Hoǁeǀeƌ, ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes ǁho saǁ theŵselǀes as ͚tƌaŶsĐƌiďeƌs͛ had fƌeƋueŶtlǇ ďeeŶ Đaught up in the 
poǁeƌful ƌealist assuŵptioŶ of laŶguage as a ͞Đultuƌe-iŶdepeŶdeŶt eŶtitǇ͟ ;MasoŶ, ϮϬϬϵ:ϱϱͿ. When 
explicitly questioned about hoǁ theǇ Đaptuƌe the ĐlieŶt͛s ǀoiĐe thƌough the iŶteƌpƌeteƌ, several 
participants were unsettled and questioned their previous assumptions. But these same 
Representatives also showed awareness of the paradox through their difficulties with sponsors who 
do Ŷot ͚giǀe͛ the ƌespoŶse theǇ aƌe lookiŶg foƌ, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to eŵotioŶs. To soŵe eǆteŶt 
this is a question of interview technique – the less experienced Representatives (LR2, LR3, LR5) spoke 
about their fears of being reduced to leading questions; the more experienced were confident in their 
abilities to extract emotional displays relating to the Rules. However, the majority were also aware 
that this was not just a question of skill. Atkinson and Silverman have argued that in the West we live 
iŶ aŶ ͚iŶteƌǀieǁ soĐietǇ͛ ǁheƌe the iŶteƌǀieǁ is a ͞soĐial teĐhŶiƋue͟ foƌ the ͞ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of the self͟ 
(in Kvale, 2007:7). The majority of the sponsors reliant on Legal Aid are not experienced in producing 
theiƌ ͚selǀes͛ foƌ displaǇ thƌough the foƌuŵ of aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ aŶd/oƌ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe (whether native English-
speakers or not). ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes͛ ƌole iŶ dƌaftiŶg the stateŵeŶt involves translation into this culture: 
theǇ aid iŶ the pƌoduĐtioŶ of a ͚self͛ ;the ŶaƌƌatoƌͿ ǁith ǁhiĐh to displaǇ the spoŶsoƌ aŶd the 
ƌelatioŶship as geŶuiŶe. This is doŶe fiƌstlǇ thƌough pƌeseŶtiŶg aŶ ͚autheŶtiĐ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ usiŶg 
descriptive categories that resonate in a UK-cultural forum such as family background and education. 
It is theŶ ŵaiŶtaiŶed ďǇ giǀiŶg the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ a Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ͚ǀoiĐe͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh to pƌeseŶt the stoƌǇ. 
 Conclusion 
 
Previous studies have conclusively demonstrated the ethnocentric cultural content of UK family 
immigration law and how this plays out in appeal determinations (Menski, 2011; Shah, 2011; 
Woodman, 2009; Wray, 2006, 2009), but have not analysed of how these cultural assumptions are 
negotiated in the day-to-day application of the law. The findings of this study show that 
Representatives play a key role in translating culture in relation to both content and form. The content 
of the statement is that which has significance to UK culture as defined by the Immigration Rules and 
guidance, not that which has significance to the applicant or sponsor. The form of the statement is 
prescribed by the culture of the (rule-orientated) legal procedure and expanded upon by the 
Representative. Where experts are called in to explain jurisdictional obscurities (Menski, 2011; 
WoodŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϵͿ, ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀes ŵust gƌapple ǁith ͞ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs oǀeƌ suďtleƌ aŶd less 
tangible cultural matters – suĐh as Ŷoƌŵs aŶd ǀalues͟ ǁhiĐh ͞ŵaǇ ďe faƌ haƌdeƌ to addƌess͟ ;Good, 
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2011:115). The Representatives interviewed for this study showed explicit awareness of their role as 
cultural translators in relation to content or the practice of culture (both their own and that of their 
clients), and implicit understanding of their role as cultural translators in relation to form. Previous 
studies have shown that representation is a key factor in the realisation of a successful outcome (Genn 
and Genn, 1989; Conley and O͛Barr, 2006). Up until April 2013, access to Representatives who could 
transform and translate norms and values into the appropriate rule-oriented display (and thereby 
contribute to a successful outcome) was provided without charge to those eligible for legal aid. 
The studǇ takes up FiŶĐh͛s Đall to use the ĐoŶĐept of ͚displaǇiŶg faŵilies͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ:ϲϱͿ aŶd ĐoŶĐuƌs ǁith 
Deƌŵott aŶd “eǇŵouƌ͛s fiŶdiŶg that it is a useful soĐiologiĐal tool ;ϮϬϭϭͿ. This papeƌ has foĐused oŶ 
families for whom display is an externally-driven requirement; and for whom failing to get display 
͚ƌight͛ has ŵoƌe seǀeƌe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes thaŶ the eǆaŵples of ͚displaǇiŶg faŵilies͛ disĐussed hitheƌto iŶ 
ƌeseaƌĐh: the peŶaltǇ foƌ a ͚displaǇ failuƌe͛ foƌ these faŵilies ƌesults iŶ the iŶaďilitǇ to haǀe faŵilǇ life 
in the UK. The state is increasingly formalising what constitutes an acceptable family at the point of 
entry. Display is a legal requirement for cross-border families not only because they are frequently 
deeŵed ͚ŶoŶ-ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal͛ – Finch argues that the onus on such families for display is greater 
(2007:71) – ďut also ďeĐause of theiƌ laĐk of poǁeƌ, as HeaphǇ Ŷotes, ͞those at the ďottoŵ of soĐial 
hieƌaƌĐhies ĐoŶtiŶue to ďe suďjeĐted to iŶteŶse suƌǀeillaŶĐe͟ ;ϮϬϭϭ:ϮϲͿ. FiŶĐh oďseƌǀes that ǁe liǀe iŶ 
͞a ǁoƌld ǁheƌe faŵilies aƌe defiŶed ďǇ the Ƌualitative character of the relationships rather than by 
ŵeŵďeƌship͟ ;ϮϬϬϳ:ϳϭͿ. This studǇ illustƌates that Đƌoss-border marriages are defined by both rigid 
family membership criteria, and also through the Đouple͛s display of the ͚qualitative character͛ of their 
relationship; judgement of which is used to award and limit potential membership of the nation-
group. As loŶg as the ‘ules aŶd GuidaŶĐe ĐoŶtiŶue to eŶaĐt a foƌŵ of ͞ŵoƌal gate-keepiŶg͟ ;WƌaǇ, 
2006) then spouses will continue to be judged in relation to how well they measure up to invisible and 
fiǆed ŶotioŶs of Đultuƌal Ŷoƌŵs: hoǁ ǁell theǇ displaǇ ͚geŶuiŶeŶess͛.  
 
1 Foƌ ease of ƌefeƌeŶĐe I ƌefeƌ to ͚ŵaƌƌiages͛ aŶd ͚spouses͛ thƌoughout.  
2 A study of asylum in the U.S. found success rates are three times higher for those with representation (Ramji-
Nogales et al quoted in Good, 2011:219).  
3 EEA nationals are exempt from these restrictions  
4 See Charsley and Liversage (2011) on the interface between polygamy and migration. 
5 Minimum wage calculated at April 2012 rates. 
6 A lengthy list including convicted criminals, the unhealthy, those who knowingly or unknowingly submit false 
documents, those who fail to supply information when requested and more generally ǁheŶ eǆĐlusioŶ ͞is 
conducive to the public good or because [sic], for example, the applicant's conduct [...] character, associations, 
or other reasons, make it undesirable to grant them entƌǇ ĐleaƌaŶĐe.͟ ;HCϯϵϱ, AppeŶdiǆ FM: “-EC.1.5). 
7 Such as English language ability and those who practice monogamy.  
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8 Southall Black Sisters (see Quila) argue that there is no evidential basis for linking forced marriage to 
immigration policy, a stance supported by empirical work undertaken Gangoli, Razak and McCurry (2006) and 
Hester et al (2007).  
9 “ee also BaƌskǇ ;ϭϵϵϰͿ ǁho aƌgues the suĐĐessful ƌefugee iŶ CaŶada is oŶe ǁho ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐts a pƌoduĐtiǀe 
Otheƌ͛. 
10 Words in italics denote when the Representative is typing at the same time as speaking. 
11 See Sweeney, 2007. 
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